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L L
ong-term care expenditures constitute one of the largest uninsured fi nanong-term care expenditures constitute one of the largest uninsured fi nancial risks facing the elderly in the United States and thus play a central role cial risks facing the elderly in the United States and thus play a central role in determining the retirement security of elderly Americans. Long-term in determining the retirement security of elderly Americans. Long-term care is a broad umbrella term for a wide range of supportive and health services care is a broad umbrella term for a wide range of supportive and health services for individuals whose physical and/or mental impairments do not allow them to for individuals whose physical and/or mental impairments do not allow them to independently perform basic functions of daily living. Such care currently accounts independently perform basic functions of daily living. Such care currently accounts for almost 9 percent of total health expenditures in the United States (Centers for for almost 9 percent of total health expenditures in the United States (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010) , and these expenditures are expected to Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010) , and these expenditures are expected to grow substantially over the coming decades as the population ages (OECD, 2011b) . grow substantially over the coming decades as the population ages (OECD, 2011b) . However, much of this risk is uninsured. About one-third of these expenditures However, much of this risk is uninsured. About one-third of these expenditures are paid for out of pocket, about 60 percent are paid for by the public sector, in are paid for out of pocket, about 60 percent are paid for by the public sector, in particular, by Medicaid, which is the primary public insurance program for longparticular, by Medicaid, which is the primary public insurance program for longterm care; only about 4 percent are paid for by private insurance (CBO, 2004) . term care; only about 4 percent are paid for by private insurance (CBO, 2004) . 1 1 U.S. long-term care policy discussions have been grappling with how to rede-U.S. long-term care policy discussions have been grappling with how to redesign Medicaid in a manner that limits the pressure on public budgets while still sign Medicaid in a manner that limits the pressure on public budgets while still ensuring that individuals have some protection against the potentially catastrophic ensuring that individuals have some protection against the potentially catastrophic nature of long-term care expenditures. Part of this public discussion has focused nature of long-term care expenditures. Part of this public discussion has focused 1 More recent Congressional Budget Offi ce estimates were not available at the time this paper went to press. Communications with CBO offi cials indicate that these estimates may be updated in the near future. on how to correct perceived problems with the functioning of the private longon how to correct perceived problems with the functioning of the private longterm care insurance market in the hopes that a better-functioning private market term care insurance market in the hopes that a better-functioning private market might be able to alleviate some of the pressure on public programs. Policy has been might be able to alleviate some of the pressure on public programs. Policy has been evolving rapidly over the last 15 years. Many states have introduced tax subsidies for evolving rapidly over the last 15 years. Many states have introduced tax subsidies for private insurance purchase and, especially within the last fi ve years, have attempted private insurance purchase and, especially within the last fi ve years, have attempted redesigns of their Medicaid programs with a goal of encouraging private insurance. redesigns of their Medicaid programs with a goal of encouraging private insurance. Although the healthcare reform bill signed by President Obama in 2010 focused Although the healthcare reform bill signed by President Obama in 2010 focused primarily on acute health care, it also contained a less-well-known provision to create primarily on acute health care, it also contained a less-well-known provision to create a new role for the federal government as the direct provider of voluntary long-term a new role for the federal government as the direct provider of voluntary long-term care insurance policies. On October 14, 2011, as this article was going to press, the care insurance policies. On October 14, 2011, as this article was going to press, the Obama administration announced that it was abandoning the implementation of Obama administration announced that it was abandoning the implementation of this controversial program. We will summarize below some of the design problems this controversial program. We will summarize below some of the design problems that led to this program's early demise. that led to this program's early demise.
In this essay, we begin by providing some background on the nature and In this essay, we begin by providing some background on the nature and extent of long-term care expenditures and insurance against those expenditures, extent of long-term care expenditures and insurance against those expenditures, emphasizing in particular the large and variable nature of the expenditures and emphasizing in particular the large and variable nature of the expenditures and the extreme paucity of private insurance coverage. We then provide some detail the extreme paucity of private insurance coverage. We then provide some detail on the nature of the private long-term care insurance market and the available on the nature of the private long-term care insurance market and the available evidence on the reasons for its small size, including private market imperfections evidence on the reasons for its small size, including private market imperfections and factors that limit the demand for such insurance. We highlight how the availand factors that limit the demand for such insurance. We highlight how the availability of public long-term care insurance through Medicaid is an important factor ability of public long-term care insurance through Medicaid is an important factor suppressing the market for private long-term care insurance. In the fi nal section, suppressing the market for private long-term care insurance. In the fi nal section, we describe and discuss recent long-term care insurance public policy initiatives at we describe and discuss recent long-term care insurance public policy initiatives at both the state and federal level. both the state and federal level.
While we focus on the United States, many of the economic issues apply more While we focus on the United States, many of the economic issues apply more broadly to other countries, where long-term care policy is also an area of current broadly to other countries, where long-term care policy is also an area of current activity (OECD, 2005) . Interestingly, while the United States is an outlier relative to activity (OECD, 2005) . Interestingly, while the United States is an outlier relative to other OECD countries in terms of the level of its healthcare expenditures, the same other OECD countries in terms of the level of its healthcare expenditures, the same cannot be said for long-term care. As Figure 1 indicates, the U.S. share of GDP spent cannot be said for long-term care. As Figure 1 indicates, the U.S. share of GDP spent on long-term care expenditures (1 percent in 2008) is quite similar to that of many of on long-term care expenditures (1 percent in 2008) is quite similar to that of many of the OECD countries; in contrast, overall U.S. health expenditure as a share of GDP the OECD countries; in contrast, overall U.S. health expenditure as a share of GDP is a marked outlier in the OECD (OECD, 2011a, b) . While most OECD countries is a marked outlier in the OECD (OECD, 2011a, b) . While most OECD countries other than the United States have universal social insurance systems for acute health other than the United States have universal social insurance systems for acute health care, many do not have such programs for long-term care. For example, both the care, many do not have such programs for long-term care. For example, both the United Kingdom and Canada have means-tested public programs for long-term care. United Kingdom and Canada have means-tested public programs for long-term care. Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, and Austria have introduced universal social insurGermany, Japan, Luxembourg, and Austria have introduced universal social insurance programs for long-term care only within the last 20 years (OECD, 2005) . ance programs for long-term care only within the last 20 years (OECD, 2005) .
Many issues about long-term care insurance and related public policy are not Many issues about long-term care insurance and related public policy are not well understood. Most academic attention devoted to health insurance focuses on well understood. Most academic attention devoted to health insurance focuses on hospital, emergency department, and outpatient care, as well as prescription drugs. hospital, emergency department, and outpatient care, as well as prescription drugs. The "academic-papers-written-to-public-expenditures" ratio is far lower for longThe "academic-papers-written-to-public-expenditures" ratio is far lower for longterm care than for the health sector as a whole. We hope, therefore, that in addition term care than for the health sector as a whole. We hope, therefore, that in addition to providing some guidance to our current understanding of these important issues, to providing some guidance to our current understanding of these important issues, this paper helps to encourage and focus future research on these topics. this paper helps to encourage and focus future research on these topics.
Long-Term Care Expenditures and Financing Long-Term Care Expenditures and Financing
In 2008, long-term care expenditures in the United States were $203 billion, In 2008, long-term care expenditures in the United States were $203 billion, representing 8.7 percent of total healthcare expenditures for all ages and about representing 8.7 percent of total healthcare expenditures for all ages and about 1.4 percent of GDP (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010) . Over the 1.4 percent of GDP (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010) . Over the coming decades, rising life expectancies will swell the numbers of "very old," who coming decades, rising life expectancies will swell the numbers of "very old," who are disproportionately intensive users of long-term care services. For example, the are disproportionately intensive users of long-term care services. For example, the number of elderly in the United States aged 80 and over is projected to double as number of elderly in the United States aged 80 and over is projected to double as a share of the population between and 2050 (OECD, 2011b , and long-term a share of the population between and 2050 (OECD, 2011b , and long-term care use rises very sharply with age (U.S. Congress, 2004) . care use rises very sharply with age (U.S. Congress, 2004) . A v e r a g e U n i t e d S t a t e s S w e d e n S p a i n P o l a n d N o r w a y N e w Z e a l a n d N e t h e r l a n d s K o r e a J a p a n G e r m a n y F r a n c e C a n a d a A u s t r a l i a Total LTC expenditure Public LTC expenditure Long-term care expenditures have been growing faster than all healthcare Long-term care expenditures have been growing faster than all healthcare expenditures over the last half century and are projected to continue to outpace expenditures over the last half century and are projected to continue to outpace overall healthcare spending growth over the next 40 years (OECD, 2011a, b; CBO, overall healthcare spending growth over the next 40 years (OECD, 2011a, b; CBO, 2011) . This projection may be somewhat surprising given that the long-term care 2011). This projection may be somewhat surprising given that the long-term care sector has not witnessed much technological change, which is considered the sector has not witnessed much technological change, which is considered the primary driver of rising expenditures in the health sector as a whole (as Newhouse, primary driver of rising expenditures in the health sector as a whole (as Newhouse, 1992, explained in this journal). Long-term care services are extremely labor-1992, explained in this journal). Long-term care services are extremely laborintensive, primarily involving hands-on care and personal services, and not heavily intensive, primarily involving hands-on care and personal services, and not heavily driven by technological factors; indeed, as we discuss in Brown and Finkelstein driven by technological factors; indeed, as we discuss in Brown and Finkelstein (2008) , nursing home costs are typically projected to grow at the rate of real wage (2008), nursing home costs are typically projected to grow at the rate of real wage growth. While we are not aware of any studies that carefully decompose the sources growth. While we are not aware of any studies that carefully decompose the sources of growth for long-term care expenditures, we suspect that the relative growth of of growth for long-term care expenditures, we suspect that the relative growth of long-term care arises because long-term care expenditures have an even steeper age long-term care arises because long-term care expenditures have an even steeper age gradient than expenditures for acute care and thus are disproportionately affected gradient than expenditures for acute care and thus are disproportionately affected by the aging of the population. by the aging of the population.
Long-term care includes both home health care for people residing in the Long-term care includes both home health care for people residing in the community as well as institutional care provided in nursing homes or assisted living community as well as institutional care provided in nursing homes or assisted living facilities. Expenditures on home health care account for about one-third of the total facilities. Expenditures on home health care account for about one-third of the total long-term care spending (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010). Institulong-term care spending (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010). Institutional care is much more expensive than home care, so that while most expenditures tional care is much more expensive than home care, so that while most expenditures on long-term care are due to nursing home care, most people receiving care do so on long-term care are due to nursing home care, most people receiving care do so outside of an institutional setting (U.S. Congress, 2004) . On average in the United outside of an institutional setting (U.S. Congress, 2004) . On average in the United States, nursing homes cost almost $6,000 per month (Metlife Mature Market Institute, States, nursing homes cost almost $6,000 per month (Metlife Mature Market Institute, 2009) . Assisted living facilities tend to cost about half as much as a nursing home 2009). Assisted living facilities tend to cost about half as much as a nursing home (Metlife Mature Market Institute, 2009) ; data from the 1980s and 1990s also suggest (Metlife Mature Market Institute, 2009) ; data from the 1980s and 1990s also suggest that their use is much less common than nursing homes (Brown and Finkelstein that their use is much less common than nursing homes (Brown and Finkelstein 2008) . Although we do not know of any recent data on this topic, anecdotally it is 2008). Although we do not know of any recent data on this topic, anecdotally it is believed that use of assisted living has grown over the last several decades. believed that use of assisted living has grown over the last several decades.
Lifetime long-term care expenditures are spread unevenly across the populaLifetime long-term care expenditures are spread unevenly across the population. Between 35 and 50 percent of 65 year-olds will use a nursing home at some tion. Between 35 and 50 percent of 65 year-olds will use a nursing home at some point in their remaining lives. Of those who use a nursing home, 10 to 20 percent point in their remaining lives. Of those who use a nursing home, 10 to 20 percent will live there more than fi ve years (Brown and Finkelstein, 2009) . This indicates will live there more than fi ve years (Brown and Finkelstein, 2009) . This indicates the presence of a sizable right tail of the distribution of nursing home expenditures. the presence of a sizable right tail of the distribution of nursing home expenditures.
In short, the possibility of needing long-term care is exactly the sort of large, In short, the possibility of needing long-term care is exactly the sort of large, uncertain expenditure risk for which insurance would seem to be most valuable. Yet uncertain expenditure risk for which insurance would seem to be most valuable. Yet most long-term care expenditure risk is not insured. As noted earlier, the Congresmost long-term care expenditure risk is not insured. As noted earlier, the Congressional Budget Offi ce (2004) estimates that 4 percent of long-term care expenditures sional Budget Offi ce (2004) estimates that 4 percent of long-term care expenditures are paid for by private insurance, while 33 percent are paid out of pocket. By are paid for by private insurance, while 33 percent are paid out of pocket. By contrast, in the healthcare sector as a whole, private insurance pays for about onecontrast, in the healthcare sector as a whole, private insurance pays for about onethird of expenditures and only about 12 percent are paid out of pocket (Centers for third of expenditures and only about 12 percent are paid out of pocket (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010 Congress, 2004; Eiken, Sredl, Burwell, and Gold, 2010) . As we will discuss in more Congress, 2004; Eiken, Sredl, Burwell, and Gold, 2010) . As we will discuss in more detail, Medicaid offers a highly imperfect form of insurance as it essentially comes detail, Medicaid offers a highly imperfect form of insurance as it essentially comes with a deductible of nearly all of one's income and a substantial share of one's assets. with a deductible of nearly all of one's income and a substantial share of one's assets.
Medicare, the near-universal public health insurance program for the elderly, is Medicare, the near-universal public health insurance program for the elderly, is designed mostly to cover costs associated with recovery from acute illness episodes, designed mostly to cover costs associated with recovery from acute illness episodes, rather than long-term impairment. Medicare covers nursing care for no more than rather than long-term impairment. Medicare covers nursing care for no more than 100 days; only if this care is in a skilled nursing facility, not in custodial nursing 100 days; only if this care is in a skilled nursing facility, not in custodial nursing homes more typical of long-term care; and only if this care follows a hospital stay of homes more typical of long-term care; and only if this care follows a hospital stay of more than three consecutive days. Medicare has evolved to provide some coverage more than three consecutive days. Medicare has evolved to provide some coverage of genuine long-term home health care (U.S. Congress, 2004; CBO, 2004) . Even of genuine long-term home health care (U.S. Congress, 2004; CBO, 2004) . Even so, home care is a relatively small component of total long-term care expenses, and so, home care is a relatively small component of total long-term care expenses, and Medicare covers only a small portion of home care costs (in Brown and Finkelstein, Medicare covers only a small portion of home care costs (in Brown and Finkelstein, 2007, we provide a more-detailed discussion). 2007, we provide a more-detailed discussion).
A pervasive concern about the fi nancing of long-term care-whether through A pervasive concern about the fi nancing of long-term care-whether through public or private insurance-is the potential not only to distort the amount of care public or private insurance-is the potential not only to distort the amount of care away from the social optimum (as is a concern with any health insurance product) away from the social optimum (as is a concern with any health insurance product) but also to distort the source of that care. One concern is that insurance that covers but also to distort the source of that care. One concern is that insurance that covers nursing home care rather than (or more than) home care may distort people's nursing home care rather than (or more than) home care may distort people's decisions regarding entry into institutional care. A similar issue arises in the choice decisions regarding entry into institutional care. A similar issue arises in the choice between market-based care and informal, unpaid long-term care provided by relatives between market-based care and informal, unpaid long-term care provided by relatives or friends; the latter is generally not covered by insurance. Our calculations using or friends; the latter is generally not covered by insurance. Our calculations using data from the Health and Retirement Survey suggest that the share of individuals data from the Health and Retirement Survey suggest that the share of individuals aged 70+ who are receiving informal care (defi ned as unpaid help from any source) aged 70+ who are receiving informal care (defi ned as unpaid help from any source) has increased slightly over the past decade, from 8.1 percent in 1998 to 9.9 percent in has increased slightly over the past decade, from 8.1 percent in 1998 to 9.9 percent in 2010. While estimating the magnitude of informal care provision is naturally diffi cult, 2010. While estimating the magnitude of informal care provision is naturally diffi cult, the existing estimates all tend to suggest that it is quite important; low-end estimates the existing estimates all tend to suggest that it is quite important; low-end estimates generate an implicit value of informal care that is about 60 percent of market spending, generate an implicit value of informal care that is about 60 percent of market spending, while other estimates suggest the implicit spending on informal care may exceed the while other estimates suggest the implicit spending on informal care may exceed the formal expenditures (CBO, 2004; U.S. Congress, 2004 , and sources cited therein). formal expenditures (CBO, 2004; U.S. Congress, 2004 , and sources cited therein). In recognition of this issue, some OECD countries have recently attempted policy In recognition of this issue, some OECD countries have recently attempted policy initiatives to allow individuals to use public insurance to provide monetary support initiatives to allow individuals to use public insurance to provide monetary support to informal caregivers (OECD, 2005) . Still, the economics of informal care provision to informal caregivers (OECD, 2005) . Still, the economics of informal care provision remains a relatively understudied topic and an important area for future work. remains a relatively understudied topic and an important area for future work. Plans, 2007) . typical age of purchaser is in the low 60s (America's Health Insurance Plans, 2007). Our estimates from earlier waves of the Health and Retirement Survey suggest that Our estimates from earlier waves of the Health and Retirement Survey suggest that the share of the population insured has been edging up: in the late 1990s, only the share of the population insured has been edging up: in the late 1990s, only about 10 percent of 60-69 year-olds had long-term care insurance, compared to about 10 percent of 60-69 year-olds had long-term care insurance, compared to over 13 percent by 2008. over 13 percent by 2008. Table 1 shows private long-term care insurance ownership patterns among the Table 1 shows private long-term care insurance ownership patterns among the elderly across demographic groups. Ownership rates are relatively constant by age elderly across demographic groups. Ownership rates are relatively constant by age among the elderly. Men and women have similar rates of ownership. Perhaps the among the elderly. Men and women have similar rates of ownership. Perhaps the most striking pattern is that ownership rates rise monotonically with wealth, from most striking pattern is that ownership rates rise monotonically with wealth, from just over 4 percent of individuals in the bottom wealth quintile to over one-quarter just over 4 percent of individuals in the bottom wealth quintile to over one-quarter of individuals in the top wealth quintile. As we will discuss below, this may well of individuals in the top wealth quintile. As we will discuss below, this may well refl ect the role of Medicaid's means-tested insurance. refl ect the role of Medicaid's means-tested insurance.
In contrast to the market for acute healthcare insurance, the market for longIn contrast to the market for acute healthcare insurance, the market for longterm care insurance is dominated by individual rather than group contracts, even term care insurance is dominated by individual rather than group contracts, even though, since 1996, employer-provided long-term care insurance has benefi ted from though, since 1996, employer-provided long-term care insurance has benefi ted from the same tax subsidy as employer-provided acute health insurance (Wiener, Tilly, the same tax subsidy as employer-provided acute health insurance (Wiener, Tilly, and Goldenson, 2000) . Of all new long-term care insurance sold in 2009, 79 percent and Goldenson, 2000) . Of all new long-term care insurance sold in 2009, 79 percent of premiums (of a total of about $600 million) and 58 percent of contracts (of a of premiums (of a total of about $600 million) and 58 percent of contracts (of a total of about 365,000) were sold in the individual market; of policies in force in total of about 365,000) were sold in the individual market; of policies in force in 2009, 82 percent of premiums and 67 percent of contracts were individual (LIMRA 2009, 82 percent of premiums and 67 percent of contracts were individual (LIMRA International, 2010) . Given the dominance of the individual market, our discussion International, 2010). Given the dominance of the individual market, our discussion concentrates on that segment. concentrates on that segment. Plans, 2007) . Virtually all (90 percent) of policies sold in the individual market cover both home and nursing home care; this refl ects an increasing move away from cover both home and nursing home care; this refl ects an increasing move away from nursing-home-only policies, which were about two-thirds of the market in 1990. nursing-home-only policies, which were about two-thirds of the market in 1990. Most policies have deductibles-typically 30 to 90 days-during which an individual Most policies have deductibles-typically 30 to 90 days-during which an individual must be receiving care before benefi t payments can begin; they also typically have must be receiving care before benefi t payments can begin; they also typically have maximum lifetime durations for benefi ts of 1-8 years, although about one-quarter maximum lifetime durations for benefi ts of 1-8 years, although about one-quarter of policies have unlimited durations. of policies have unlimited durations.
Unlike most private acute health insurance policies, which reimburse for Unlike most private acute health insurance policies, which reimburse for covered expenses (subject to charges being "reasonable"), private long-term care covered expenses (subject to charges being "reasonable"), private long-term care insurance policies typically set a relatively low maximum on the amount of covered insurance policies typically set a relatively low maximum on the amount of covered expenses that the policy will reimburse per day in care. The average maximum daily expenses that the policy will reimburse per day in care. The average maximum daily benefi t for nursing home care for policies sold in 2005 was only $142, which was benefi t for nursing home care for policies Moreover, since payouts from most long-term care insurance policies will often occur, if they occur at all, a decade or long-term care insurance policies will often occur, if they occur at all, a decade or more after purchase of the policy-when the purchaser is in his or her early 80s more after purchase of the policy-when the purchaser is in his or her early 80s (Brown and Finkelstein, 2009 )-and about one-quarter of policies have a maximum (Brown and Finkelstein, 2009 )-and about one-quarter of policies have a maximum daily benefi t that is fi xed in nominal terms, the daily benefi t caps are even more daily benefi t that is fi xed in nominal terms, the daily benefi t caps are even more binding in practice. binding in practice. For analytical purposes, we defi ne a "typical" purchased policy (based on For analytical purposes, we defi ne a "typical" purchased policy (based on America's Health Insurance Plans, 2007) as a policy that covers institutional America's Health Insurance Plans, 2007) as a policy that covers institutional and home care with a 60-day deductible, a four-year benefi t period, and a $150 and home care with a 60-day deductible, a four-year benefi t period, and a $150 maximum daily benefi t with a 5 percent per year escalation rate. We calculated maximum daily benefi t with a 5 percent per year escalation rate. We calculated the share of expenditures covered by such a policy. The data and the (many) the share of expenditures covered by such a policy. The data and the (many) assumptions are discussed in detail in an online Appendix available with this assumptions are discussed in detail in an online Appendix available with this paper at paper at 〈 〈http://e-jep.org http://e-jep.org〉 〉. Our estimates suggest that this policy would cover . Our estimates suggest that this policy would cover about two-thirds of expected present discount value, long-term care expendiabout two-thirds of expected present discount value, long-term care expenditures if purchased at age 65 and held until death. This ratio is noticeably higher tures if purchased at age 65 and held until death. This ratio is noticeably higher for men than women (72 percent compared to 61 percent) because women for men than women (72 percent compared to 61 percent) because women have much higher expected utilization of care, and thus the benefi t limits (both have much higher expected utilization of care, and thus the benefi t limits (both daily and lifetime caps) are more binding. The escalation feature of the policy daily and lifetime caps) are more binding. The escalation feature of the policy is critical; the same policy with constant nominal benefi ts covers only about oneis critical; the same policy with constant nominal benefi ts covers only about onethird of expected expenditures, barely half as much as the policy with escalating third of expected expenditures, barely half as much as the policy with escalating benefi ts. If the deductible is shortened from 60 to 30 days and the maximum benefi ts. If the deductible is shortened from 60 to 30 days and the maximum benefi t period extended from four years to lifetime, our measure of comprehenbenefi t period extended from four years to lifetime, our measure of comprehensiveness rises from about two-thirds to 95 percent. siveness rises from about two-thirds to 95 percent.
Long-Term Care Insurance Pricing Long-Term Care Insurance Pricing
How expensive are long-term care insurance policies? Table 2 shows median How expensive are long-term care insurance policies? Table 2 shows median annual premiums in July 2010 by age of purchase for four different private longannual premiums in July 2010 by age of purchase for four different private longterm care insurance policies. The data are from a long-term care insurance software term care insurance policies. The data are from a long-term care insurance software package (primarily designed for insurance agents and brokers), which aims to cover package (primarily designed for insurance agents and brokers), which aims to cover most major carriers. These policies all cover institutional and home care, and have a most major carriers. These policies all cover institutional and home care, and have a maximum daily benefi t amount of $150. They differ in their deductible (60 day or maximum daily benefi t amount of $150. They differ in their deductible (60 day or 30 day), their benefi t period (four year or unlimited), and whether or not the daily 30 day), their benefi t period (four year or unlimited), and whether or not the daily benefi t is constant in nominal terms or escalates at 5 percent per year (compounded). benefi t is constant in nominal terms or escalates at 5 percent per year (compounded).
As with term life insurance policies, annual premiums for long-term care As with term life insurance policies, annual premiums for long-term care insurance policies are fi xed in nominal terms. Median annual premiums for 65 yearinsurance policies are fi xed in nominal terms. Median annual premiums for 65 yearolds range from about $2,200 to about $7,700 depending on the coverage details. olds range from about $2,200 to about $7,700 depending on the coverage details. Premiums rise sharply by age; for example, for the "typical" policy described above, Premiums rise sharply by age; for example, for the "typical" policy described above, row 2 indicates that the annual premium is about $2,800 if purchased at age 55, row 2 indicates that the annual premium is about $2,800 if purchased at age 55, $4,500 if purchased at age 65, and $9,600 if purchased at age 75. Premiums are $4,500 if purchased at age 65, and $9,600 if purchased at age 75. Premiums are the same for men and women and do not vary across geographic areas, although the same for men and women and do not vary across geographic areas, although companies may offer a given policy in only a subset of states. Policies are guaranteed companies may offer a given policy in only a subset of states. Policies are guaranteed renewable regardless of future changes in health. renewable regardless of future changes in health.
The "load" of an insurance policy is a standard method of comparing how The "load" of an insurance policy is a standard method of comparing how much individuals pay in premiums relative to how much they can expect to receive much individuals pay in premiums relative to how much they can expect to receive in benefi ts. It is defi ned as: in benefi ts. It is defi ned as:
expected present discounted value of benefi ts ____ expected present discounted value of premiums ) .
An actuarially fair policy has a load of zero; the measure of benefi ts paid out by the insurance company is equal to the measure of premiums that the individual will pay. The higher the load, the lower the expected return on the policy will be.
We calculated loads for the policies shown in Table 2 , using data and assumpWe calculated loads for the policies shown in Table 2 , using data and assumptions about premiums, benefi ts, current and projected utilization rates for long-term tions about premiums, benefi ts, current and projected utilization rates for long-term Notes: All policies cover nursing home, assisted living and home care with a $150 daily benefi t. Premium data are from "LTC Quote Plus" software taken in July 2010. We observe about 20 policies for each policy type.
care, current and projected costs for long-term care, and an appropriate interest care, current and projected costs for long-term care, and an appropriate interest rate for discounting future benefi ts and costs. Once again, the details are described rate for discounting future benefi ts and costs. Once again, the details are described in the online Appendix (available at in the online Appendix (available at 〈 〈http://e-jep.org http://e-jep.org〉 〉). The estimates are sensitive ). The estimates are sensitive to the assumptions used, especially the projections of how care utilization and costs to the assumptions used, especially the projections of how care utilization and costs will evolve over the next 40 years and the appropriate discount rate (Brown and will evolve over the next 40 years and the appropriate discount rate (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007) . However, our basic conclusion is that loads are quite high. For Finkelstein, 2007) . However, our basic conclusion is that loads are quite high. For the "typical" policy described above (a $150 daily benefi t that escalates at 5 percent the "typical" policy described above (a $150 daily benefi t that escalates at 5 percent nominal per year, and covers institutional and home care with a 60-day deductible nominal per year, and covers institutional and home care with a 60-day deductible and a four-year benefi t period), we estimate that if the policy is purchased at 65 and a four-year benefi t period), we estimate that if the policy is purchased at 65 (about the typical purchase age) and premiums are paid annually until the poli-(about the typical purchase age) and premiums are paid annually until the policyholder dies, the load is 32 cents on the dollar. In other words, for every dollar cyholder dies, the load is 32 cents on the dollar. In other words, for every dollar paid in expected present discounted value premiums, the typical policyholder can paid in expected present discounted value premiums, the typical policyholder can expect to receive back only 68 cents in expected present discounted value benefi ts. expect to receive back only 68 cents in expected present discounted value benefi ts. Estimates of loads at 65 for the other policies shown in Table 2 are similar, and are Estimates of loads at 65 for the other policies shown in Table 2 are similar, and are presented in the Appendix. presented in the Appendix.
Of course, we would not expect the load to be zero: insurance companies Of course, we would not expect the load to be zero: insurance companies presumably have administrative costs and profi ts. Still, a 32 cent load is high presumably have administrative costs and profi ts. Still, a 32 cent load is high compared with other insurance markets. For example, the estimated load on compared with other insurance markets. For example, the estimated load on life annuities purchased at age 65 is about 15 to 25 cents on the dollar (Mitchell, life annuities purchased at age 65 is about 15 to 25 cents on the dollar (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown, 1999) and the estimated load for health insurPoterba, Warshawsky, and Brown, 1999) and the estimated load for health insurance policies is about 6 to 10 cents on the dollar for group health insurance and 25 ance policies is about 6 to 10 cents on the dollar for group health insurance and 25 to 30 cents on the dollar for the (less-commonly purchased) nongroup acute health to 30 cents on the dollar for the (less-commonly purchased) nongroup acute health insurance (Newhouse, 2002) . insurance (Newhouse, 2002) .
Moreover, our calculation of a 32 cent load will underestimate the load for Moreover, our calculation of a 32 cent load will underestimate the load for a typical policyholder. This is because it was calculated under the assumption a typical policyholder. This is because it was calculated under the assumption that an individual, after purchasing a policy, continues to pay premiums until that an individual, after purchasing a policy, continues to pay premiums until that individual dies. In practice, however, individuals often stop paying premiums that individual dies. In practice, however, individuals often stop paying premiums on existing policies; when such "policy lapsation" (as the industry calls it) occurs, on existing policies; when such "policy lapsation" (as the industry calls it) occurs, individuals generally lose eligibility for subsequent benefi ts. individuals generally lose eligibility for subsequent benefi ts.
4 4 Accounting for lapsaAccounting for lapsation increases the load on the typical policy just discussed; a policyholder who buys tion increases the load on the typical policy just discussed; a policyholder who buys such a policy but faces the population average "termination" probability can expect such a policy but faces the population average "termination" probability can expect to get back only 50 cents (instead of 68 cents) on the dollar in expected present to get back only 50 cents (instead of 68 cents) on the dollar in expected present value of benefi ts for every dollar paid in expected present value of premiums. value of benefi ts for every dollar paid in expected present value of premiums. Accounting for policy lapsation also substantially reduces the expected share of Accounting for policy lapsation also substantially reduces the expected share of long-term care expenditures a policy will cover. For example, the coverage share long-term care expenditures a policy will cover. For example, the coverage share for the typical policy described in the previous section declines from 65 percent to for the typical policy described in the previous section declines from 65 percent to 37 percent. Lapsation has such a large effect in part because it is so common: on 37 percent. Lapsation has such a large effect in part because it is so common: on average about 5 percent of policies lapse per year, and lapse rates are particularly average about 5 percent of policies lapse per year, and lapse rates are particularly high in the few years immediately after purchasing a policy (Society of Actuaries, high in the few years immediately after purchasing a policy (Society of Actuaries, 2007). 2007).
5 5 In addition, lapsation is quite costly because premiums (which are constant In addition, lapsation is quite costly because premiums (which are constant nominal amounts paid annually from the time of purchase) are quite front-loaded nominal amounts paid annually from the time of purchase) are quite front-loaded relative to benefi ts, which are paid out on average in later years. relative to benefi ts, which are paid out on average in later years. Table 3 also shows a striking difference in this market in loads for men relative Table 3 also shows a striking difference in this market in loads for men relative to women. For example, again for this typical policy, we estimate a load at age 65 to women. For example, again for this typical policy, we estimate a load at age 65 that is 55 cents on the dollar for men compared to 13 cents on the dollar for women that is 55 cents on the dollar for men compared to 13 cents on the dollar for women (if the policy is held until death). The difference arises because premiums are the (if the policy is held until death). The difference arises because premiums are the same for men and women, but a 65 year-old woman is over 50 percent more likely same for men and women, but a 65 year-old woman is over 50 percent more likely to ever use a nursing home than a 65 year-old man, and conditional on using a to ever use a nursing home than a 65 year-old man, and conditional on using a nursing home, her average length of stay will be about 50 percent longer. These nursing home, her average length of stay will be about 50 percent longer. These gender differences partly (although not entirely) refl ect women's longer longevity gender differences partly (although not entirely) refl ect women's longer longevity (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007) . These large utilization differences between men and (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007) . These large utilization differences between men and women raise an obvious puzzle: why do insurance companies not set gender-specifi c women raise an obvious puzzle: why do insurance companies not set gender-specifi c pricing? No regulatory restriction blocks them from doing so. We do not offer an pricing? No regulatory restriction blocks them from doing so. We do not offer an answer, except to note that the puzzle is not unique to long-term care insurance; answer, except to note that the puzzle is not unique to long-term care insurance; in many insurance markets, fi rms often forgo readily available information about in many insurance markets, fi rms often forgo readily available information about expected utilization. Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) The evidence of high loads on insurance policies for long-term care certainly The evidence of high loads on insurance policies for long-term care certainly suggests that standard culprits for market imperfections, such as asymmetric inforsuggests that standard culprits for market imperfections, such as asymmetric information and imperfect competition, may be important in limiting the size of this mation and imperfect competition, may be important in limiting the size of this 5 The reasons for lapsation are not well understood. Some lapsation may be a response to unanticipated negative wealth, income, or expenditure shocks. Individuals may decide that the initial purchase was a mistake. Or individuals may learn over time that they are at lower risk of long-term care utilization than they originally thought and therefore fi nd it optimal to exit the market. Finkelstein, McGarry, and Sufi (2005) present evidence consistent with this latter "dynamic selection" argument, although that does not rule out a role for these other factors as well. market. Also, there is evidence of market problems such as asymmetric information market. Also, there is evidence of market problems such as asymmetric information in the private long-term care insurance market (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006;  in the private long-term care insurance market (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006; Oster, Shoulson, Quaid, and Dorsey, 2010) . Oster, Shoulson, Quaid, and Dorsey, 2010 ). Yet high loads do not seem enough, by themselves, to explain the limited Yet high loads do not seem enough, by themselves, to explain the limited size of the private market for long-term care insurance. Our results from a calisize of the private market for long-term care insurance. Our results from a calibrated life-cycle utility model in Brown and Finkelstein (2008) suggest that even brated life-cycle utility model in Brown and Finkelstein (2008) suggest that even if, contrary to fact, there were no supply-side market failures and comprehensive if, contrary to fact, there were no supply-side market failures and comprehensive private policies were available at actuarially fair prices, approximately the lower private policies were available at actuarially fair prices, approximately the lower two-thirds of the wealth distribution would not wish to purchase actuarially fair two-thirds of the wealth distribution would not wish to purchase actuarially fair comprehensive private policies because of the presence of Medicaid. In other comprehensive private policies because of the presence of Medicaid. In other words, as fi rst conjectured by Pauly (1990) , the consumption fl oor provided by words, as fi rst conjectured by Pauly (1990) , the consumption fl oor provided by Medicaid's "payer of last resort" role substantially curtails demand for private Medicaid's "payer of last resort" role substantially curtails demand for private insurance. For example, in Brown and Finkelstein (2008), we estimate that for insurance. For example, in Brown and Finkelstein (2008), we estimate that for a 65 year-old male at the median of the wealth distribution, 60 percent of the a 65 year-old male at the median of the wealth distribution, 60 percent of the expected present discounted value of benefi ts paid from a private policy are expected present discounted value of benefi ts paid from a private policy are redundant of benefi ts that, absent private insurance, would have been paid by redundant of benefi ts that, absent private insurance, would have been paid by Medicaid. For a female at the median of the wealth distribution, this "implicit tax" Medicaid. For a female at the median of the wealth distribution, this "implicit tax" from Medicaid is closer to 75 percent. from Medicaid is closer to 75 percent.
The implicit tax levied by Medicaid on private insurance arises from two sources. The implicit tax levied by Medicaid on private insurance arises from two sources. First, because Medicaid applies both asset and income tests to determine eligibility, First, because Medicaid applies both asset and income tests to determine eligibility, individuals who own private insurance are less likely to qualify for Medicaid. In individuals who own private insurance are less likely to qualify for Medicaid. In this way, the very objective of a private insurance policy-to protect one's resources this way, the very objective of a private insurance policy-to protect one's resources against the risks of high out-of-pocket expenditures-makes it less likely that the against the risks of high out-of-pocket expenditures-makes it less likely that the individual will spend down suffi ciently to qualify for Medicaid. Second, Medicaid is individual will spend down suffi ciently to qualify for Medicaid. Second, Medicaid is a secondary payer; by law, Medicaid requires that private insurance pay any benefi ts a secondary payer; by law, Medicaid requires that private insurance pay any benefi ts it owes fi rst, even if the individual is eligible to be covered by Medicaid, and only it owes fi rst, even if the individual is eligible to be covered by Medicaid, and only once the private policy has been exhausted is Medicaid then responsible for any once the private policy has been exhausted is Medicaid then responsible for any residual expenses it covers. residual expenses it covers.
Variation in the implicit tax from Medicaid-that is, in the extent to which Variation in the implicit tax from Medicaid-that is, in the extent to which Medicaid benefi ts are reduced by the purchase of private insurance-may help to Medicaid benefi ts are reduced by the purchase of private insurance-may help to explain some of the patterns of insurance ownership across demographic groups explain some of the patterns of insurance ownership across demographic groups that were shown in Table 1 . The Medicaid implicit tax is higher for lower-wealth that were shown in Table 1 . The Medicaid implicit tax is higher for lower-wealth individuals (since they have a higher fraction of their expected long-term care individuals (since they have a higher fraction of their expected long-term care costs covered by Medicaid in the absence of private insurance), which presumably costs covered by Medicaid in the absence of private insurance), which presumably contributes to the high positive wealth gradient of private long-term care insurance contributes to the high positive wealth gradient of private long-term care insurance ownership. At a given wealth level, the implicit tax imposed by Medicaid is also ownership. At a given wealth level, the implicit tax imposed by Medicaid is also much larger for women than for men because women have higher expected longmuch larger for women than for men because women have higher expected longterm care expenditures than men, so, in the absence of private insurance, a higher term care expenditures than men, so, in the absence of private insurance, a higher proportion of women's expenditures would have been covered by Medicaid. As a proportion of women's expenditures would have been covered by Medicaid. As a result, the "net loads" are much more similar for men and women than the "gross result, the "net loads" are much more similar for men and women than the "gross loads" shown in Table 3 and discussed above. This fact can help explain the puzzle loads" shown in Table 3 and discussed above. This fact can help explain the puzzle of very similar ownership rates by gender (Table 1) despite very different "gross of very similar ownership rates by gender (Table 1) despite very different "gross loads" (for example, 55 cents for men versus 13 cents on the dollar for women for loads" (for example, 55 cents for men versus 13 cents on the dollar for women for the "typical" policy if held till death). the "typical" policy if held till death).
Medicaid's crowding out of private insurance demand matters for several Medicaid's crowding out of private insurance demand matters for several reasons. For starters, there is the standard deadweight loss that arises from the need reasons. For starters, there is the standard deadweight loss that arises from the need to raise tax revenues to fi nance Medicaid. But in addition, our calibration results to raise tax revenues to fi nance Medicaid. But in addition, our calibration results in Brown and Finkelstein (2008) indicate that Medicaid provides a very imperfect in Brown and Finkelstein (2008) indicate that Medicaid provides a very imperfect consumption-smoothing mechanism for all but the poorest of individuals. This is consumption-smoothing mechanism for all but the poorest of individuals. This is because Medicaid's income and asset eligibility requirements impose severe restricbecause Medicaid's income and asset eligibility requirements impose severe restrictions on an individual's ability to smooth consumption across states of care (or tions on an individual's ability to smooth consumption across states of care (or health) and over time. In essence, one can think of Medicaid as an insurance policy health) and over time. In essence, one can think of Medicaid as an insurance policy with a very large deductible set at a substantial share of one's assets. with a very large deductible set at a substantial share of one's assets. These fi ndings, that Medicaid may substantially reduce private insurance These fi ndings, that Medicaid may substantially reduce private insurance demand far up the wealth distribution while providing very limited insurance to all demand far up the wealth distribution while providing very limited insurance to all but the poorest individuals, raise the question of possible reforms to Medicaid, which but the poorest individuals, raise the question of possible reforms to Medicaid, which we discuss in the next section. However, it is important to emphasize that, while our we discuss in the next section. However, it is important to emphasize that, while our fi ndings suggest that Medicaid reform may be fi ndings suggest that Medicaid reform may be necessary before a substantial portion before a substantial portion of the elderly purchase private long-term care insurance, such a reform may not be of the elderly purchase private long-term care insurance, such a reform may not be suffi cient. Even if much or all of the Medicaid implicit tax were eliminated, other . Even if much or all of the Medicaid implicit tax were eliminated, other factors could still prevent the market for long-term care insurance from developing. factors could still prevent the market for long-term care insurance from developing. We regard a greater understanding of these non-Medicaid-induced constraints on We regard a greater understanding of these non-Medicaid-induced constraints on the private long-term care insurance market as an important area for further work. the private long-term care insurance market as an important area for further work. Here, we briefl y note some of the demand-side forces that could limit demand for Here, we briefl y note some of the demand-side forces that could limit demand for private insurance even absent a Medicaid implicit tax. (Some supply-side factors like private insurance even absent a Medicaid implicit tax. (Some supply-side factors like asymmetric information and imperfect competition have already been mentioned.) asymmetric information and imperfect competition have already been mentioned.) In the conclusion, we also speculate on additional factors that are specifi c to the In the conclusion, we also speculate on additional factors that are specifi c to the long-term (versus annual) nature of contracts in this market. long-term (versus annual) nature of contracts in this market.
An important potential demand-side limit to the private insurance market is An important potential demand-side limit to the private insurance market is the existence of other potential imperfect substitutes for private long-term care the existence of other potential imperfect substitutes for private long-term care insurance, such as informal insurance provided by family members who may either insurance, such as informal insurance provided by family members who may either provide cash to pay for care or directly provide care themselves. More broadly, provide cash to pay for care or directly provide care themselves. More broadly, family interactions represent a potentially important but still poorly understood family interactions represent a potentially important but still poorly understood determinant of demand for products like long-term care insurance. For example, determinant of demand for products like long-term care insurance. For example, bequest motives may motivate the purchase of long-term care insurance in order bequest motives may motivate the purchase of long-term care insurance in order to protect bequeathable assets, either for altruistic or for strategic reasons. On the to protect bequeathable assets, either for altruistic or for strategic reasons. On the other hand, Lockwood (2011) points out that those with bequest motives may have other hand, Lockwood (2011) points out that those with bequest motives may have 6 Of course, it is possible that individuals can avoid having their personal assets implicitly taxed away if they engage in careful "Medicaid planning." For example, individuals may be able to hide assets from the means-test by various means, including giving cash gifts to children or grandchildren, establishing trusts, or spending the money on assets that are excluded from the Medicaid asset test. Medicaid rules allow state Medicaid programs to account for assets that individuals have disposed of during a specifi ed look-back period, but empirical evidence is mixed as to how strongly these rules are enforced and how feasible it is to qualify for Medicaid by hiding assets. While anecdotal evidence suggests that asset hiding may be common, the fact that a substantial portion of long-term care spending is out-of-pocket suggests that it is far from universal. To the extent that individuals are able to protect some of their assets from the Medicaid asset test, this would increase the insurance protection provided by the program. However, by making Medicaid an even more-attractive alternative to private insurance, it would also increase the crowd-out of private insurance.
lower demand for long-term care insurance than those without bequest motives. lower demand for long-term care insurance than those without bequest motives. This effect arises because one of the benefi ts of long-term care insurance is that it This effect arises because one of the benefi ts of long-term care insurance is that it allows individuals to reduce the need for precautionary savings against uncertain allows individuals to reduce the need for precautionary savings against uncertain medical expenditures; this in turn reduces accidental bequests. Thus, for those medical expenditures; this in turn reduces accidental bequests. Thus, for those who do not value bequests, the ability to convert accidental bequests into consumpwho do not value bequests, the ability to convert accidental bequests into consumption is quite valuable. This ability to convert accidental bequests into consumption tion is quite valuable. This ability to convert accidental bequests into consumption by purchasing long-term care insurance is less valuable to those who gain utility by purchasing long-term care insurance is less valuable to those who gain utility from bequests. from bequests.
Another potential informal substitute for long-term care insurance is the Another potential informal substitute for long-term care insurance is the illiquid assets in one's home, which may discourage the purchase of private insurilliquid assets in one's home, which may discourage the purchase of private insurance by simultaneously providing a buffer stock of assets that can be liquidated in ance by simultaneously providing a buffer stock of assets that can be liquidated in the event one needs to pay for care, and increasing the marginal utility of liquid the event one needs to pay for care, and increasing the marginal utility of liquid wealth that would be used to pay for premiums (Davidoff, 2010) . Such alternatives wealth that would be used to pay for premiums (Davidoff, 2010) . Such alternatives are presumably less effi cient than private insurance; for example, buffer stock assets are presumably less effi cient than private insurance; for example, buffer stock assets held against a possible need for long-term care represent foregone consumption if held against a possible need for long-term care represent foregone consumption if the need does not materialize. the need does not materialize.
Behavioral factors such as limited consumer knowledge about long-term care Behavioral factors such as limited consumer knowledge about long-term care utilization risk, public insurance coverage, or the functioning of a private insurutilization risk, public insurance coverage, or the functioning of a private insurance contract, along with limited rationality, may also constrain demand. Given that ance contract, along with limited rationality, may also constrain demand. Given that consumers also appear to exhibit weak demand for other long-horizon insurance consumers also appear to exhibit weak demand for other long-horizon insurance products, such as life annuities, it may also be that individuals have particular diffiproducts, such as life annuities, it may also be that individuals have particular difficulty making decisions about long-term, probabilistic outcomes. For this reason, culty making decisions about long-term, probabilistic outcomes. For this reason, consumers may be more likely to stick with the status quo or default option (which, consumers may be more likely to stick with the status quo or default option (which, in this case, would be going without long-term care insurance). We know of no in this case, would be going without long-term care insurance). We know of no recent studies of such behavioral factors specifi c to the private long-term care insurrecent studies of such behavioral factors specifi c to the private long-term care insurance market; however, there is certainly ample evidence of low levels of fi nancial ance market; however, there is certainly ample evidence of low levels of fi nancial literacy and potential implications for fi nancial planning (for example, Lusardi and literacy and potential implications for fi nancial planning (for example, Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a, b) , of behavioral factors being important in similar markets, such Mitchell, 2007a, b) , of behavioral factors being important in similar markets, such as that for life annuities (Brown et al., 2008; Benartzi, Previtero, Thaler, this issue) , as that for life annuities (Brown et al., 2008; Benartzi, Previtero, Thaler, this issue) , and of diffi culties that individuals may have understanding low-probability, high-loss and of diffi culties that individuals may have understanding low-probability, high-loss events (for example, Kunreuther, 1978) . events (for example, Kunreuther, 1978) .
Finally, if marginal utility of consumption is substantially lower when one is Finally, if marginal utility of consumption is substantially lower when one is sick and in a nursing home, this will lower demand for private long-term care insursick and in a nursing home, this will lower demand for private long-term care insurance and-unlike many of the other explanations-this argument would not point ance and-unlike many of the other explanations-this argument would not point directly to social and private welfare losses stemming from nonpurchase. directly to social and private welfare losses stemming from nonpurchase. 7 7 7 A priori, it is not obvious whether marginal utility of consumption rises or falls with deteriorating health. After all, some goods (like travel or tennis) may be complements to good health while others (like help around the house or a plasma television) may be substitutes. Using a sample of the elderly in the Health and Retirement Survey, Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2008) provide evidence consistent with the marginal utility of consumption falling as health declines, which suggests that private long-term care insurance is not valued as highly as a state-independent utility function would suggest. Still, our calibrations in Brown and Finkelstein (2008) suggest that even substantial negative state dependence-more than four times larger than that estimated by Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2008) -cannot by itself explain most of the substantial nonpurchase of private long-term care insurance, although it may be a contributing factor.
Public Policy toward Long-Term Care in the United States Public Policy toward Long-Term Care in the United States
Given the substantial role of Medicaid in impeding private insurance demandGiven the substantial role of Medicaid in impeding private insurance demandas well as the existence of similar means-tested public insurance programs in Canada as well as the existence of similar means-tested public insurance programs in Canada and the United Kingdom-we fi rst discuss whether, in principle, such a program and the United Kingdom-we fi rst discuss whether, in principle, such a program can be redesigned to provide meaningful insurance coverage without substantially can be redesigned to provide meaningful insurance coverage without substantially crowding out private insurance demand. We then turn to a discussion of recent crowding out private insurance demand. We then turn to a discussion of recent public policy in the United States and what we can surmise about its likely effects. public policy in the United States and what we can surmise about its likely effects.
Public Policy in Principle: How to Reduce Medicaid's Implicit Tax Public Policy in Principle: How to Reduce Medicaid's Implicit Tax
Conceptually, the way to reduce Medicaid's implicit tax is to structure the Conceptually, the way to reduce Medicaid's implicit tax is to structure the payment system so that the expected value of transfer payments received from payment system so that the expected value of transfer payments received from the government is less affected by an individual's decision of whether to purchase the government is less affected by an individual's decision of whether to purchase private long-term care insurance. For example, if it were possible to predict with private long-term care insurance. For example, if it were possible to predict with accuracy the expected present value of Medicaid benefi ts that an individual would accuracy the expected present value of Medicaid benefi ts that an individual would receive if that individual went uninsured, then one could offer the individual a receive if that individual went uninsured, then one could offer the individual a payment equal to that amount in return for agreeing to forgo any additional payment equal to that amount in return for agreeing to forgo any additional governmental support for paying for long-term care. The logic here is simply that governmental support for paying for long-term care. The logic here is simply that of the effi ciency of lump-sum taxation: by separating the resource transfer from of the effi ciency of lump-sum taxation: by separating the resource transfer from marginal decision-making, one avoids distorting decision making. While such marginal decision-making, one avoids distorting decision making. While such a policy-approach would, by defi nition, not reduce the present value of publiclya policy-approach would, by defi nition, not reduce the present value of publiclyfunded, long-term care expenditures, it would (in theory) lead to welfare-enhancing funded, long-term care expenditures, it would (in theory) lead to welfare-enhancing increases in private insurance coverage. increases in private insurance coverage.
In practice, of course, such a policy would be extremely diffi cult to implement. In practice, of course, such a policy would be extremely diffi cult to implement. Policymakers would need access to a wide range of health and wealth informaPolicymakers would need access to a wide range of health and wealth information to assess the likelihood that an individual would need care and the likelihood tion to assess the likelihood that an individual would need care and the likelihood that he or she would become Medicaid-eligible in the absence of private insurthat he or she would become Medicaid-eligible in the absence of private insurance. Even with such information, adverse selection is likely to be high in such a ance. Even with such information, adverse selection is likely to be high in such a program; presumably the individuals least likely to use formal care would choose program; presumably the individuals least likely to use formal care would choose to opt-out of Medicaid in exchange for the payment, whereas those most likely to opt-out of Medicaid in exchange for the payment, whereas those most likely to use care would stay in the Medicaid system. Further, it is questionable whether to use care would stay in the Medicaid system. Further, it is questionable whether the political environment would accept an outcome in which an individual "opted the political environment would accept an outcome in which an individual "opted out" of the Medicaid system and then needed care but did not have the resources out" of the Medicaid system and then needed care but did not have the resources to access it. If other systems (government-provided or charity) arose to serve as to access it. If other systems (government-provided or charity) arose to serve as an alternative payer-of-last resort, these programs would simply replace Medicaid an alternative payer-of-last resort, these programs would simply replace Medicaid in imposing an implicit tax on private insurance purchases. There are no simple, in imposing an implicit tax on private insurance purchases. There are no simple, practical solutions. practical solutions.
One natural direction of reform would be to expand Medicaid by methods such One natural direction of reform would be to expand Medicaid by methods such as reducing or eliminating the income and asset eligibility tests. This would increase as reducing or eliminating the income and asset eligibility tests. This would increase public insurance coverage but at the cost of substantial public funds and presumably public insurance coverage but at the cost of substantial public funds and presumably even greater crowd-out of the residual private insurance market. The other natural even greater crowd-out of the residual private insurance market. The other natural direction of reform would be to scale back Medicaid benefi ts by reducing eligibility direction of reform would be to scale back Medicaid benefi ts by reducing eligibility and/or reducing benefi ts. This would reduce public expenditures and potentially and/or reducing benefi ts. This would reduce public expenditures and potentially encourage private insurance market purchases, but it would run the risk that since encourage private insurance market purchases, but it would run the risk that since the private market response could be limited, particularly for certain groups in the the private market response could be limited, particularly for certain groups in the population, overall risk exposure could increase. population, overall risk exposure could increase.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given this discussion, most of the recent public Perhaps not surprisingly, given this discussion, most of the recent public policy initiatives have had limited effects on reducing Medicaid's implicit tax or policy initiatives have had limited effects on reducing Medicaid's implicit tax or in stimulating private insurance demand. We discuss three main types of recent in stimulating private insurance demand. We discuss three main types of recent policy initiatives: tax subsidies for private long-term care insurance; different states' policy initiatives: tax subsidies for private long-term care insurance; different states' decisions regarding the amount of assets Medicaid allows benefi ciary households decisions regarding the amount of assets Medicaid allows benefi ciary households to keep; and more-fundamental reforms through the interaction of state "Partnerto keep; and more-fundamental reforms through the interaction of state "Partnership" programs in how Medicaid and private insurance interact. Finally, we describe ship" programs in how Medicaid and private insurance interact. Finally, we describe the recently failed federal initiative to sell private long-term care insurance. the recently failed federal initiative to sell private long-term care insurance.
Tax Incentives for the Purchase of Private Insurance Tax Incentives for the Purchase of Private Insurance
A natural approach for stimulating private insurance demand is to subsidize its A natural approach for stimulating private insurance demand is to subsidize its cost. Subsidies might seem like a particularly appropriate remedy given the implicit cost. Subsidies might seem like a particularly appropriate remedy given the implicit "tax" Medicaid imposes on private insurance for long-term care; and more gener-"tax" Medicaid imposes on private insurance for long-term care; and more generally, they might seem an appropriate approach to reducing the effect of the high ally, they might seem an appropriate approach to reducing the effect of the high loads in this market discussed earlier. In addition, a desire among policymakers to loads in this market discussed earlier. In addition, a desire among policymakers to shift costs away from Medicaid has led to increasing interest in the use of tax subsishift costs away from Medicaid has led to increasing interest in the use of tax subsidies to stimulate the purchase of private long-term care insurance (Goda, 2011) . dies to stimulate the purchase of private long-term care insurance (Goda, 2011) .
The United States has a history of generous tax subsidies for health insurance;
The United States has a history of generous tax subsidies for health insurance; in particular, employer contributions to health insurance premiums are not subject in particular, employer contributions to health insurance premiums are not subject to individual income taxes. A 1996 federal tax reform similarly made employerto individual income taxes. A 1996 federal tax reform similarly made employerprovided long-term care insurance exempt from employee taxable income (Wiener, provided long-term care insurance exempt from employee taxable income (Wiener, Tilly, and Goldenson, 2000) . As noted earlier, most long-term care insurance is still Tilly, and Goldenson, 2000). As noted earlier, most long-term care insurance is still provided through the nongroup market, and in that market, a limited federal tax provided through the nongroup market, and in that market, a limited federal tax subsidy for long-term care insurance was introduced in 1997 as a result of the prior subsidy for long-term care insurance was introduced in 1997 as a result of the prior year's passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). year's passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). This provision allows for long-term care insurance premiums (up to an annual cap This provision allows for long-term care insurance premiums (up to an annual cap that varies with age) to be included as an "unreimbursed medical expense" for that varies with age) to be included as an "unreimbursed medical expense" for purposes of calculating tax deductions. However, this tax incentive is only effective purposes of calculating tax deductions. However, this tax incentive is only effective for those who have itemized deductions that exceed 7.5 percent of Adjusted Gross for those who have itemized deductions that exceed 7.5 percent of Adjusted Gross Income. At the state level as of 2008, 24 states plus the District of Columbia had Income. At the state level as of 2008, 24 states plus the District of Columbia had enacted a tax subsidy for the purchase of long-term care insurance (Goda, 2011) . enacted a tax subsidy for the purchase of long-term care insurance (Goda, 2011) .
Our calibration results in Brown and Finkelstein (2008) discussed earlier Our calibration results in Brown and Finkelstein (2008) discussed earlier suggested that, even under relatively generous assumptions, exempting employer suggested that, even under relatively generous assumptions, exempting employer contributions to long-term care insurance premiums from taxable income would contributions to long-term care insurance premiums from taxable income would not do much to reduce Medicaid's implicit tax, and hence to increase private not do much to reduce Medicaid's implicit tax, and hence to increase private insurance demand. Indeed, federal tax subsidies are relatively poorly designed for insurance demand. Indeed, federal tax subsidies are relatively poorly designed for reducing the implicit tax since marginal tax rates (and thus federal tax subsidies) reducing the implicit tax since marginal tax rates (and thus federal tax subsidies) increase with income while the Medicaid implicit tax decreases with wealth. increase with income while the Medicaid implicit tax decreases with wealth.
Empirical estimates of the price elasticity of demand for long-term care Empirical estimates of the price elasticity of demand for long-term care insurance are consistent with these calibration results. For example, Goda (2011) insurance are consistent with these calibration results. For example, Goda (2011) examines the impact of tax subsidies empirically using variation across time and examines the impact of tax subsidies empirically using variation across time and states in the introduction of state tax subsidies. Between 1996 and 2008, 21 states states in the introduction of state tax subsidies. Between 1996 and 2008, 21 states implemented tax subsidies for private long-term care insurance premiums. On implemented tax subsidies for private long-term care insurance premiums. On average, these state tax subsidies reduce the after-tax price of private insurance average, these state tax subsidies reduce the after-tax price of private insurance by about 5 percent and, Goda estimates, increase private insurance purchases by by about 5 percent and, Goda estimates, increase private insurance purchases by individuals ages 50-69 by about 2.7 percentage points (or almost 30 percent). Thus, individuals ages 50-69 by about 2.7 percentage points (or almost 30 percent). Thus, while the tax subsidies induce a large proportional share in individuals buying while the tax subsidies induce a large proportional share in individuals buying insurance, their effect is small relative to the number of uninsured. Courtemanche insurance, their effect is small relative to the number of uninsured. Courtemanche and He (2009) also investigate the effect of tax subsidies on purchases of private and He (2009) also investigate the effect of tax subsidies on purchases of private long-term care insurance using a different empirical strategy and fi nd similar-sized long-term care insurance using a different empirical strategy and fi nd similar-sized results. Overall, tax subsidies can increase private insurance demand on the margin, results. Overall, tax subsidies can increase private insurance demand on the margin, but they are unlikely to be useful in substantially reducing the aggregate exposure but they are unlikely to be useful in substantially reducing the aggregate exposure to long-term care expenditure risk among the U.S. elderly. to long-term care expenditure risk among the U.S. elderly. 8 8
State Choices Regarding the Parameters of Medicaid State Choices Regarding the Parameters of Medicaid
Medicaid's asset protection rules determine the amount and form of assets one Medicaid's asset protection rules determine the amount and form of assets one can keep while qualifying for Medicaid. These rules vary substantially across states. can keep while qualifying for Medicaid. These rules vary substantially across states. In Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein (2007), we estimate that for near-and young-elderly In Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein (2007), we estimate that for near-and young-elderly married households in 2000, moving from the most common set of state rules (in married households in 2000, moving from the most common set of state rules (in effect in about half of the states) to the second most common set of state rules effect in about half of the states) to the second most common set of state rules (in effect in about one-third of states) would on average allow a married household to (in effect in about one-third of states) would on average allow a married household to keep approximately an additional $20,000 more in assets (approximately 30 percent keep approximately an additional $20,000 more in assets (approximately 30 percent of average fi nancial assets) when one spouse enters a nursing home. The difference of average fi nancial assets) when one spouse enters a nursing home. The difference in the amount one can keep under different rules depends on one's asset levels and in the amount one can keep under different rules depends on one's asset levels and reaches as high as almost $40,000 (for households with assets around $85,000). Using reaches as high as almost $40,000 (for households with assets around $85,000). Using the variation in Medicaid's asset protection across individuals based on their state the variation in Medicaid's asset protection across individuals based on their state of residence, marital status, and asset holding, we estimate that a $10,000 decrease of residence, marital status, and asset holding, we estimate that a $10,000 decrease in the level of assets an individual can keep while qualifying for Medicaid would in the level of assets an individual can keep while qualifying for Medicaid would increase private long-term care insurance coverage by 1.1 percentage points. To put increase private long-term care insurance coverage by 1.1 percentage points. To put this in perspective, if every state in the country moved from their current Medicaid this in perspective, if every state in the country moved from their current Medicaid asset eligibility requirements to the most stringent Medicaid eligibility requirements asset eligibility requirements to the most stringent Medicaid eligibility requirements allowed by federal law, this would decrease average household assets protected from allowed by federal law, this would decrease average household assets protected from Medicaid by about $25,000. This, in turn, would increase the demand for private Medicaid by about $25,000. This, in turn, would increase the demand for private long-term care insurance by only 2.7 percentage points. While this represents a long-term care insurance by only 2.7 percentage points. While this represents a large increase in insurance coverage relative to the baseline ownership rate, the vast large increase in insurance coverage relative to the baseline ownership rate, the vast majority of households would still fi nd it unattractive to purchase private insurance. majority of households would still fi nd it unattractive to purchase private insurance. Of course, a wholesale restructuring of Medicaid could have more-signifi cant effects Of course, a wholesale restructuring of Medicaid could have more-signifi cant effects on private insurance coverage. on private insurance coverage.
is partially paid by private insurance, that individual is delaying eligibility for is partially paid by private insurance, that individual is delaying eligibility for Medicaid because the assets that are typically protected by the insurance policy Medicaid because the assets that are typically protected by the insurance policy count against the means-test eligibility requirement. The Partnership programs count against the means-test eligibility requirement. The Partnership programs seek to address this issue by adjusting the Medicaid asset-test to account for the seek to address this issue by adjusting the Medicaid asset-test to account for the insurance coverage. However, the Partnership programs do not address Medicinsurance coverage. However, the Partnership programs do not address Medicaid's status as a secondary payer-that once an individual is Medicaid-eligible, the aid's status as a secondary payer-that once an individual is Medicaid-eligible, the private policy pays fi rst, and Medicaid picks up the difference. Our calibration private policy pays fi rst, and Medicaid picks up the difference. Our calibration results discussed earlier suggest that eliminating only one of the two sources of the results discussed earlier suggest that eliminating only one of the two sources of the Medicaid implicit tax by itself does not do much to stimulate demand for private Medicaid implicit tax by itself does not do much to stimulate demand for private insurance, which is consistent with the relatively low level of sales of long-term care insurance, which is consistent with the relatively low level of sales of long-term care insurance in Partnership states. insurance in Partnership states.
To eliminate the implicit tax completely, the Partnership programs would To eliminate the implicit tax completely, the Partnership programs would have to be combined with a policy that made Medicaid the primary, rather than have to be combined with a policy that made Medicaid the primary, rather than the secondary, payer for long-term care expenses once a person qualifi es for the secondary, payer for long-term care expenses once a person qualifi es for Medicaid. In this situation, private providers of long-term care insurance could Medicaid. In this situation, private providers of long-term care insurance could base premiums only on the "incremental" coverage over and above what Medicaid base premiums only on the "incremental" coverage over and above what Medicaid would provide. Of course, such an approach could substantially increase total would provide. Of course, such an approach could substantially increase total Medicaid expenditures. Medicaid expenditures.
The CLASS Act The CLASS Act
The Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act was The Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act was one of the provisions of the healthcare reform bill signed into law by President one of the provisions of the healthcare reform bill signed into law by President Obama in 2010. Under this program, the federal government was to directly sell Obama in 2010. Under this program, the federal government was to directly sell private long-term care insurance policies to the public. On October 14, 2011, private long-term care insurance policies to the public. On October 14, 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services announced that it was going the Department of Health and Human Services announced that it was going to abandon the implementation of this program, which had grown increasingly to abandon the implementation of this program, which had grown increasingly controversial since the passage of the legislation. The intent of the legislation was controversial since the passage of the legislation. The intent of the legislation was to create a program in which individuals who paid monthly premiums for at least to create a program in which individuals who paid monthly premiums for at least fi ve years would be eligible to receive a cash benefi t (varying by degree of funcfi ve years would be eligible to receive a cash benefi t (varying by degree of functional impairment but averaging no less than $50 per day initially) if and when tional impairment but averaging no less than $50 per day initially) if and when they meet the health-related benefi t trigger. Individuals receiving benefi ts would they meet the health-related benefi t trigger. Individuals receiving benefi ts would have been permitted to use the payments to pay for traditional long-term care have been permitted to use the payments to pay for traditional long-term care including home health care, assisted living, and nursing homes, as well as a wide including home health care, assisted living, and nursing homes, as well as a wide range of other services (for example, home modifi cations, assistive technology, range of other services (for example, home modifi cations, assistive technology, and respite care). and respite care).
The implementation of the CLASS Act was abandoned primarily because The implementation of the CLASS Act was abandoned primarily because the poorly designed program was projected by a range of independent experts the poorly designed program was projected by a range of independent experts to be fi scally unsustainable. The legislation directed the Secretary of Health and to be fi scally unsustainable. The legislation directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to set premiums at a level that would be suffi cient to maintain Human Services to set premiums at a level that would be suffi cient to maintain program solvency over 75 years. In practice, however, this meant that premiums program solvency over 75 years. In practice, however, this meant that premiums would likely be below "actuarially fair" levels. To understand why, imagine that would likely be below "actuarially fair" levels. To understand why, imagine that individuals start paying premiums immediately, but the average payout will not individuals start paying premiums immediately, but the average payout will not occur for, say, 25 years in the future. To oversimplify, a 75-year "solvency" calculaoccur for, say, 25 years in the future. To oversimplify, a 75-year "solvency" calculation counts 75 years of premium payments, but only 50 years of benefi t payments. tion counts 75 years of premium payments, but only 50 years of benefi t payments.
Thus a program could be technically solvent on a 75-year horizon even though it Thus a program could be technically solvent on a 75-year horizon even though it is being run on a negative net present value basis. This fi nancial problem was to is being run on a negative net present value basis. This fi nancial problem was to be magnifi ed by the fact that the legislation required that individuals below the be magnifi ed by the fact that the legislation required that individuals below the poverty line and full-time students be able to participate at only $5 per month (in poverty line and full-time students be able to participate at only $5 per month (in 2009 dollars), far below the actuarial cost. As a result of the differential pricing 2009 dollars), far below the actuarial cost. As a result of the differential pricing structure and short period of participation required for eligibility, a number of structure and short period of participation required for eligibility, a number of experts voiced concerns about serious adverse selection into this voluntary program experts voiced concerns about serious adverse selection into this voluntary program (for example, American Academy of Actuaries, Mussey, 2010) . Despite the (for example, American Academy of Actuaries, Mussey, 2010) . Despite the fact that the legislation allowed (but did not require) employers to automatically fact that the legislation allowed (but did not require) employers to automatically enroll individuals, the Congressional Budget Offi ce (2009) 
Concluding Comments Concluding Comments
The irony of the existing long-term care insurance system in the United States The irony of the existing long-term care insurance system in the United States is that public expenditures are expected to grow rapidly, and yet, at the same time, is that public expenditures are expected to grow rapidly, and yet, at the same time, individuals still face signifi cant personal fi nancial risk from long-term care. These individuals still face signifi cant personal fi nancial risk from long-term care. These twin concerns have led many policymakers in search of "solutions" that rely on twin concerns have led many policymakers in search of "solutions" that rely on insuring a greater share of this risk through private markets. insuring a greater share of this risk through private markets.
While there is much we still do not know about the market for long-term care While there is much we still do not know about the market for long-term care insurance, the knowledge we do have suggests that substantial growth of the private insurance, the knowledge we do have suggests that substantial growth of the private market is signifi cantly hampered by two features of Medicaid-means-testing and market is signifi cantly hampered by two features of Medicaid-means-testing and its secondary payer status-which combine to impose a large implicit tax on private its secondary payer status-which combine to impose a large implicit tax on private insurance and to crowd out the purchase of private insurance for most of the wealth insurance and to crowd out the purchase of private insurance for most of the wealth distribution. Attempts to reduce the implicit tax and stimulate private insurance distribution. Attempts to reduce the implicit tax and stimulate private insurance markets tend to have at least one of two undesirable consequences: either they markets tend to have at least one of two undesirable consequences: either they increase public expenditures, for example, by making Medicaid a primary payer increase public expenditures, for example, by making Medicaid a primary payer and reducing means testing; or they require that policymakers be willing to deny and reducing means testing; or they require that policymakers be willing to deny care to individuals who fail to insure themselves adequately. In addition, we still care to individuals who fail to insure themselves adequately. In addition, we still know relatively little about how the private market would respond, on either the know relatively little about how the private market would respond, on either the demand or the supply side, to Medicaid reforms. In other words, the evidence demand or the supply side, to Medicaid reforms. In other words, the evidence today suggests that Medicaid reform is a today suggests that Medicaid reform is a necessary condition for substantial growth condition for substantial growth in the private long-term care insurance market, but it does not at all imply that such in the private long-term care insurance market, but it does not at all imply that such reform would be reform would be suffi cient. . While existing research falls short of providing clear guidance as to the other While existing research falls short of providing clear guidance as to the other important impediments to stimulating the private market for long-term care insurimportant impediments to stimulating the private market for long-term care insurance, some insight may be gleaned by contrasting the small size of the private ance, some insight may be gleaned by contrasting the small size of the private long-term care insurance market to the much more-developed private insurance long-term care insurance market to the much more-developed private insurance market for annual health expenditures. We speculate that one key distinction market for annual health expenditures. We speculate that one key distinction between the two markets that may help account for the disparity in their develbetween the two markets that may help account for the disparity in their development is the long-term (versus annual) nature of the contracts for long-term opment is the long-term (versus annual) nature of the contracts for long-term care insurance. Long-term contracts raise a number of potential impediments to care insurance. Long-term contracts raise a number of potential impediments to both supply and demand of private insurance that are less of an issue for annual both supply and demand of private insurance that are less of an issue for annual contracts. For example, although Medicaid imposes an implicit tax on private contracts. For example, although Medicaid imposes an implicit tax on private insurance for acute, annual health insurance as well (for discussion, see Cutler and insurance for acute, annual health insurance as well (for discussion, see Cutler and Gruber, 1996) , with annual contracts the implicit tax is mostly limited to those who Gruber, 1996) , with annual contracts the implicit tax is mostly limited to those who might plausibly "spend-down" to Medicaid asset limits within a year. With a multimight plausibly "spend-down" to Medicaid asset limits within a year. With a multiyear contract like long-term care insurance, cumulative multiyear expenditures can year contract like long-term care insurance, cumulative multiyear expenditures can cause the implicit tax to crowd out demand much higher up the asset distribution cause the implicit tax to crowd out demand much higher up the asset distribution (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008) . (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008) .
In addition, the long-term nature of these contracts introduces at least three In addition, the long-term nature of these contracts introduces at least three additional sources of uncertainty between the time one purchases a contract and additional sources of uncertainty between the time one purchases a contract and the time one might plausibly receive benefi ts-for example, imagine individuals the time one might plausibly receive benefi ts-for example, imagine individuals who are considering the purchase of a long-term care policy at age 40 to cover who are considering the purchase of a long-term care policy at age 40 to cover nursing home use in their 80s. First, the organization and delivery of long-term care nursing home use in their 80s. First, the organization and delivery of long-term care is likely to change over the decades, so it is uncertain whether the policy bought is likely to change over the decades, so it is uncertain whether the policy bought today will cover what the consumer wants out of the choices available in 40 years. today will cover what the consumer wants out of the choices available in 40 years. Second, why start paying premiums now when there is some chance that by the time Second, why start paying premiums now when there is some chance that by the time long-term care is needed in several decades, the public sector may have substantially long-term care is needed in several decades, the public sector may have substantially expanded its insurance coverage? A third concern is about counterparty risk. While expanded its insurance coverage? A third concern is about counterparty risk. While insurance companies are good at pooling and hence insuring idiosyncratic risk, they insurance companies are good at pooling and hence insuring idiosyncratic risk, they may be less able to hedge the aggregate risks of rising long-term care utilization or may be less able to hedge the aggregate risks of rising long-term care utilization or long-term care costs over decades. In turn, potential buyers of such insurance may long-term care costs over decades. In turn, potential buyers of such insurance may be discouraged by the risk of future premium increases and/or insurance company be discouraged by the risk of future premium increases and/or insurance company insolvency. insolvency.
11 11 In addition to these sources of uncertainty, another issue arising In addition to these sources of uncertainty, another issue arising from the long-term nature of the contract is that extreme discounting or myopia from the long-term nature of the contract is that extreme discounting or myopia may make it less likely that today's 40 year-old even thinks hard about whether to may make it less likely that today's 40 year-old even thinks hard about whether to purchase insurance for events expected to happen many decades later. purchase insurance for events expected to happen many decades later.
While of course some of these problems can be mitigated by deferring purchase While of course some of these problems can be mitigated by deferring purchase to later years (and indeed those who do buy private insurance tend to be in their low to later years (and indeed those who do buy private insurance tend to be in their low 60s), the residual uncertainty regarding long-term care expenditures (and hence 60s), the residual uncertainty regarding long-term care expenditures (and hence the value of insurance) is also diminishing with age. Moreover, the desire to defer the value of insurance) is also diminishing with age. Moreover, the desire to defer purchase presumably contributes to the lack of much employer-based long-term purchase presumably contributes to the lack of much employer-based long-term care insurance. The paucity of employer-based long-term care insurance may also care insurance. The paucity of employer-based long-term care insurance may also be an important deterrent to the private long-term care insurance market. Employbe an important deterrent to the private long-term care insurance market. Employment-based acute health insurance provides a mechanism for reducing adverse ment-based acute health insurance provides a mechanism for reducing adverse selection and of realizing economies of scale in insurance production; as a result selection and of realizing economies of scale in insurance production; as a result of both factors, loads for employer-based acute health insurance are substantially of both factors, loads for employer-based acute health insurance are substantially lower than those in the nongroup market (Newhouse, 2002) . Employer-provision lower than those in the nongroup market (Newhouse, 2002) . Employer-provision seems likely to be an important contributor to the relatively higher functioning of seems likely to be an important contributor to the relatively higher functioning of the acute health insurance market. the acute health insurance market.
Naturally there is a high degree of casual speculation in the preceding several Naturally there is a high degree of casual speculation in the preceding several paragraphs. As the share of elderly in the U.S. population increases and policy paragraphs. As the share of elderly in the U.S. population increases and policy changes affecting long-term care insurance happen at the state and federal level, we changes affecting long-term care insurance happen at the state and federal level, we hope that others will take up the gauntlet to bring theory and evidence to bear on hope that others will take up the gauntlet to bring theory and evidence to bear on this important and interesting set of economic issues. this important and interesting set of economic issues.
